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Abstract 
 
ADVISOR: Mark Dallas  
 
A necessary condition for democracy is the ability for citizens to be heard. The way by 
which this is done is through electing officials that represent a diverse set of beliefs and values. 
The mechanism by doing this is through elections. At a quick glance, elections appear to play a 
minor role in democracy. But in fact, the foundations of elections are essential to our 
understanding of American democracy. It is assumed that the implementation of an electoral 
system is sufficient for American democracy. Diving deeper into the complexities of election 
systems provides evidence for benchmarks that prevent elections from representing democratic 
values. It holds true that elected officials rely on democratic elections to legitimize their role in 
government. Perceptions of democracy are in fact affected by the fragilities of the electoral 
process. When it all goes right, democracy appears to be protected to the perspective of citizens. 
The odds of an election going off without a hitch is one in a million. The aspects of elections that 
are most worrisome to experts as well as the public are accuracy and reliability. Past elections 
have shown that accuracy and reliability are issues of election technology and the failure of these 
aspects puts the United States’ democratic processes at risk. I argue that as of today, election 
officials and scholars are at a tossup. They cannot foresee any way to advance technology 
without risking or compromising on the accuracy and reliability of elections. This poses 
significant challenges because for elections to be accessible to all, technological advances are 
needed to accommodate those with disabilities, the elderly, and the fact that voters are busy and 
expect an easy, seamless process when they reach the polls. There are many factors that affect 
the implementation and advancement of voting technology. Previous research has provided 
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evidence that the racial composition of counties affect the ability of election administrations to 
advance to new technologies.  This thesis aims to further explore the issues of election 
technology and their role in defining democracy by analyzing different aspects of election 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
A citizen’s right to vote is essential to the democratic function of the United States 
government. The ability of citizens to indicate their preferences on election day, and perceiving 
that their vote means something, allows for elected officials to represent a diverse set of beliefs 
and values. This perception held by American citizens is unsound. The infrastructure of elections 
allows for a schizophrenic understanding of the electoral process held by citizens. I would know. 
Before becoming an intern at the Suffolk County Board of Elections, I held many of the same 
views that other voters held about elections. We, as Americans, see elections as a seamless, 
perfect process. You register to vote and on election day, you go to your designated polling 
place, cast your ballot and leave. You leave with the sentiment that your vote counts and your 
voice was heard. Perceptions of democracy are in fact affected by the fragilities of the electoral 
process. If there were problems that arose on election day, the media would report it causing 
public concern. What is lost in translation is that election day is a snapshot of the entire electoral 
process and that the most fragile aspect of this process is not what is seen on election day- the 
implementation of voting technologies. Voters use voting machines that are prepared for them. 
They do not know what occurs behind the scenes that allows for these machines to operate the 
way they do on election day. 
 In this chapter, I will bring attention to the history of election technology and its 
relevance to today’s challenges faced by election administrations, explore the current standards 
and statutes related to election technology, as well as examine how federalism plays an important 
role in the implementation of voting technology at all levels of government. I seek to establish 
that elections are in fact political. The issues that are taken on by federal, state and local 
governments are impacted by the political influences and forces that affect decision making and 
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technological advancement. The field of election technology is an overlooked area of study. This 
is noteworthy to bring attention to because this area of study is essential to the development and 
continuance of democracy. If it isn’t a high-ranking concern to officials and scholars, then there 
is a risk that democracy will be undermined. This is a risk that Americans shouldn’t be willing to 
take. Recent elections have brought the topic of election technology to the forefront of election 
administration issues, precisely noting the challenges with accuracy and reliability. These issues 
have become widely known to the public and are a topic of robust conversation. The fact that 
many see election technology as a great concern is enough for governments, scholars, and 
organizations to want to dedicate time and resources.  
1.1 History of Election Technology 
 Election technology has been implemented in the election process since the beginning of 
elections in the United States. The exact method of election technology used in elections has 
advanced, but not without hesitation and concern from election officials, elected officials, and 
scholars. These concerns mainly surround accuracy, reliability, and security. With each 
advancement there is an associated risk of threatening the stability of the function of elections 
and it does not always contribute to better voting systems. Along with this concern, there are 
other factors that play a role in the advancement of voting technology in the general sense and in 
terms of what technology each jurisdiction chooses to use. 
 Elections have made a considerable amount of advancement since the first known 
elections. In the early 1700s, there was no modern technology available to assist in the inputting 
and tabulation of voters’ preferences. The method election officials used involved sitting at a 
central location with a judge and other election officials and have citizens outwardly voice their 
 Blaustein 9 
preferences to the clerk and the judge.1 This method of collecting votes goes against the many 
conventions that are known today. For example, there were no ballots, ballot boxes, or a right to 
cast your vote secretly.2 This means that there was no way to audit or have any record to show 
the number of votes for each candidate. There is a possibility that these aspects of election 
procedure were not an important issue back then. Historically, the advancement of election 
procedure is somewhat related to historical periods. What is meant by this is that the historical 
context can help explain the circumstances associated with how the voting process was 
instituted. This sections relies heavily on the work of Douglas Jones, who is credited with 
outlining the historical account of voting technology. 
 The first ballots or method of expressing voter choice in a tangible manner was outside of 
the United States. In Ancient Greece, voters were given a token and would place it in a clay box 
expressing their preference.3 The token and ballot box method is the first documented voting 
technology. This should be prefaced with a clear definition of what constitutes a voting 
technology. A voting technology is characterized as any method (technical or not) that 
contributes to the translation of voter intent to something that can be counted. The first ballots 
are a clear example of this definition. Although clay tokens are not what is thought of a 
conventional technology, it shows that technology can be created and utilized in different ways. 
When analyzing voting technology, it is important to keep this context in mind. 
 Paper ballots were a prominent voting technology in United States during the late 1600s.4 
This type of technology is a staple in the voting process and this technology is not going to be 
 
1 Jones, Douglas W., “A Brief Illustrated History of Voting”, Voting and Elections Web Pages, The University of 
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phased out in the near future. Paper ballots provide a paper trail, allowing records of voter intent 
to be created. The Constitution addresses the use of ballots in the 12th amendment. Jones states,  
By the time the 12th Amendment to the United States Constitution was passed, it was 
clear that the term ballot was routinely taken to refer to a slip of paper on which were 
written the names of candidates for office. The very fact that the 12th amendment requires 
the use of separate ballots to elect a President and Vice-President implies that the use of 
one ballot to elect candidates to more than one office was understood at the time.5 
 
The notion that the 12th amendment, which was passed in 1789, conceptualizes the fact 
that a paper ballot would be used to indicate vote preference. Paper ballots paved the way for 
newer, more advanced technology to be created. Many voting technologies operate off of paper 
ballots. For example, current voting machines collect paper ballots that contain the voter’s 
preference. At first, voters would bring a blank sheet of paper to where they voted.6 The blank 
sheet of paper upgraded to a preprinted ballot with each candidate named.7 These ballots were 
provided by political parties and the candidates themselves.8 It is noteworthy to bring attention to 
this particular advancement because it foreshadows the many advancements that occur later in 
history and how such advancement within one technology can revolutionize the voting process.  
In 1838, there was an urgent request for a secret ballot in London, England. A secret 
ballot prevents voter intent from being revealed to those counting the votes or to those who see 
the ballots after the vote is tabulated. The secret ballot in London was a ball that would be placed 
in a hole that represented the voter’s preference.9 By dropping a ball that was the exact same as 
every other ball, the votes were indistinguishable from each other. The secret ballot is a core 
manifestation of democracy. In a democracy, there should be no pressure to vote in a particular 
 
5 Ibid. 
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way. By ensuring that voter intent is not exposed during the process, citizens are protected from 
any one or any institution from preventing that choice to be made.  
The interest of using a private ballot was held by Australians as well. In turn, Australia is 
credited with creating the Australian Paper Ballot in the 1800s. This type of ballot was 
implemented in the United States in 1888.10 The Australian Paper Ballot is a standard ballot that 
is printed and distributed by the government to voters.11 The United States did not implement the 
Australian ballot type all at once, it was done at the state’s discretion. Some states like New York 
and Massachusetts were the first to implement these ballots.12 Issues with security and fraud 
arose in previous elections which lead to this shift.13 This antiquated technology appears to be a 
less integral part of the voting process, but led to further technological advancement. 
 In a similar manner, lever voting machines are categorized as another major 
advancement in voting technology. The MIT Election Lab provides a well-written explanation of 
how this technology functions:  
Lever machines are operated by the voter indicating his or her choice by depressing a 
lever next to the preferred candidate. When the voter enters the voting machine, he or she 
pulls a large lever that pulls a curtain around the voter, ensuring privacy. There is an 
interlocking mechanism in the machine that prevents the voter from over-voting—that is, 
voting for more than the allowed number of candidates. Once the voter is finished, the 
voter pulls the large lever again, which causes the counters associated with his or her 
choices to be incremented by one and the machine prepared for the next voter. At the end 
of Election Day, votes are counted by opening the machine and reading the numbers on 
the counters associated with all the candidates. By law, mechanical lever machines may 





11 Ibid.  
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Voting Technology MIT Election Lab , https://electionlab.mit.edu/research/voting-technology, 3/12/21 
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Lever voting machines were first used in 1892, but took much longer to implement this 
technology across the United States.15 During this time period, lever voting machines were a 
considered an advanced technology. Jones states,  
Lever voting machines were so pervasive by the mid 20th century that most of us born in 
midcentury grew up assuming that all voting machines would always be lever machines. 
Today, although they have been out of production since 1982, these machines are still in 
extremely widespread use. They completely eliminate most of the approaches to 
manipulating the vote count that were endemic a century ago, and they can easily be 




This perspective illuminates a number of different concerns relating to the advancement of 
election technology. The notion that lever machines were in widespread use in 2001 is alarming. 
The Brennen Center of Justice states that election technology should be replaced after ten years 
 
15 Jones, Douglas W., “A Brief Illustrated History of Voting”, Voting and Elections Web Pages, The University of 
Iowa Department of Computer Science, 3/12/21. 
16 Ibid. 
Figure 1.1 Illustration of a lever voting machine submitted for 
patent  
Source: Jones, Douglas W., A Brief Illustrated History of Voting, 
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in use and that the technology won’t be reliable after 20 years.17 Lever machines were at risk of 
being unreliable, but many jurisdictions still depend on them. This perspective also alludes to the 
voter comfort level with this specific type of voting technology. In terms of its usage, lever 
machines were easy to understand and use, which made it less likely that voters’ preferences 
were demonstrated incorrectly. 
Punch Card Voting Machines are a voting technology that was adapted from another use. 
Punch card voting systems were first created to catalogue and run statistics for the Baltimore 
Board of Health and for other tabulations across many different fields.18 The punch card system 
works as indicated by the following description: 
In the most common version of the punch-card machine, a blank pre-scored card is 
inserted into a holder. The holder contains a ballot and a set of targets associating each 
choice with a punch position on the card. If a voter wants to vote for a candidate, he or 
she uses a stylus to dislodge a chad (the pre-scored bit of paper) and create a hole in the 
card associated with the candidate’s number. When the voter is done, he or she takes the 
ballot card and deposits it in a ballot box. At the end of Election Day, the ballots are 
counted using a card reader, usually in the central election office.19 
 
IBM is credited with creating the punch card system used for voting, but abandoned the system 
in 1969 due to well-known technology issues.20 The technology of this voting system was 
complex and used by many election jurisdictions. There were two punch card voting systems that 
were of wide use: IBM’s Votomatic system and Election Data Corporation’s Data-Punch 
system.21 From a historical perspective, this is the first instance that two private companies were 
in competition with each other, providing jurisdictions with the opportunity to choose between 
two different options. As a result, there was more variability in the voting process. A positive 
 
17 Norden and Famighetti, “America’s Voting machines at Risk”,4 
18 Ibid.  
19 Voting Technology, MIT Election Lab, , https://electionlab.mit.edu/research/voting-technology, 3/12/21 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
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consequences is that there was more access to this type of machine for all jurisdictions to 
purchase and use.  
Optical Mark-Sense scanners are similar to punch card voting systems in the sense that 
this technology had other uses before being adapted to help administer elections. Optical 
scanners were created by IBM to be used to grade the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT).22 
Furthermore, Mark-Sense Optical Scanners were created for a similar standardized test, the 
ACT.23 Optical scanners were first used in California in 1962.24 This technology worked as 
explained below: 
Optical Scan Paper Ballot Systems include both marksense and digital image scanners in 
which voters mark paper ballots that are subsequently tabulated by scanning devices. On 
most optical scan ballots voters indicate their selections by filling in an oval, completing 
an arrow or filling in a box. Ballots may be either scanned on hand-fed optical scan 
tabulators in the polling place or vote center (Precinct Count) or collected in a ballot box 
to be scanned at a central location (Central Count.) High capacity batch-fed optical scan 
tabulators are used in some jurisdictions to handle larger volumes of central count ballots. 
Optical scan voting systems can scan and tabulate ballots marked by hand or those 
marked by a ballot marking device.25 
 
This technology is an advanced method used to count votes when compared to other types of 
voting technologies. It is important to note that this technology is flexible. With the thousands of 
counties in the United States, it is important that any voting technology is adaptable to fit the 
needs of each county that uses them. These machines are still used in many jurisdictions today. 
Direct Recording Electronic (DRE’s) voting machines are a part of the latest 
advancement of voting technology. This type of voting technology was first created to assist in 





25 Voting Equipment, “Verified Voting”, Verified Voting, 3/12/21, https://verifiedvoting.org/votingequipment/ 
26 Jones, Douglas W., “A Brief Illustrated History of Voting”, Voting and Elections Web Pages, The University of 
Iowa Department of Computer Science, 3/12/21. 
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manufactured DRE’s: Electrovote and Microvote. The older model, Microvote, had too fewer 
buttons required by many jurisdictions to run their elections.27 On the other hand, Electrovote is 
considered to incorporate more technology, using a “smartcard interface” as well as a 
touchscreen.28 Since the devices have a user-friendly interface, they are manageable to use 
regardless of one’s comfort level with technology. Jones explains that the Evervote DRE as,  
… a wedge shaped affair, basically an IBM PC compatible with a touch screen, packaged 
for voting, with a secure case that prevents keyboard or mouse from being plugged in 
while it is in the polling place. The machine plugs into a network hub that also includes a 
UPS (uninterruptable power supply, including battery pack), and sits in a voting booth 
that is little more than a table with a corrugated plastic privacy screen -- this is a bare 
minimum voting booth, but the flat panel display screen on the voting machine has very 
poor off axis viewing, so the privacy is a bit better than the minimal booth suggests. 29 
Figure 1.2 illustrates the components of a DRE. The privacy shield signifies to the voter that 
their vote a private one and that their privacy is still a priority. Additionally, the touchscreen 
interface speeds up the voting process on election day. This technology tries to prevent a number 
of different issues that could occur during the voting process such as an unstable power supply 
which was seen as a problem for other voting technologies. DRE’s are no doubt one of the most 










A historical account exemplifying the advancement of voting technology is absolutely 
necessary to bring attention to. Having this understanding of the historical context aligns with 
how election boards choose to implement voting technology and how they decide to update older 
technology. On a similar note, the sequential nature of the advancement of voting technology 
provides various insights to how one voting machine and its faults contribute to the shift to new 
voting technologies. Since the beginning of elections, there has been substantial change in how 
they are administered and how votes are tabulated. The timeline brings attention to many 
concerns as to how voting machines produced in the 1980s is still being used in many 
jurisdictions today and how systems with proven problems are still being used. This leads to the 
next discussion of the 2000 election where outdated, flawed technology wreaked havoc on the 
state of Florida. 
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1.2 The 2000 Election and the Help America Vote Act 
 The 2000 Presidential Election brought attention to a number of flaws in the United 
States’ electoral process. The race between the Republican candidate, George W. Bush and 
Democratic candidate Al Gore relied heavily on the results in Florida. This race was considered 
the closest presidential election in the history of the United States and was clearly unprecedented 
that the judicial system did not know how to provide the right remedy to derive a solution to the 
situation. A significant issue that led to the uncertainty of 2000 General Election was the newly 
designed ballot used in Palm Beach County, Florida. In Palm Beach County, the puzzling design 
of the ballot used in the election and the implementation of outdated voting technology led to the 
intent of voters to not be fully represented as they wished.30 Many who intended to vote for Al 
Gore, had their vote misrepresented and in turn not counted. The chaos that ensued led to a Bush 
presidency. This sections will rely heavily on the work of a team of scholars from various 
institutions that played a significant role in analyzing constituents’ intent and what went wrong 
in Palm Beach County, Florida.31  
 Unlike the case in almost every other election carried out in the United States, the 2000 
election was a wakeup call to the country about the delicacy of the electoral process. One 
alarming summary of the findings from Brady et al. is that the voting system failed the country. 
They state, “We saw, up close, a very significant problem—the failure of our voting system to 
convert people’s vote intentions into counted votes- chopped into law-suit sized pieces that 
obliterated the larger picture and led to legalistic solutions that often seemed to miss the point."32 
The key point here is that a legal remedy would not suffice. Citizens and administrators alike 
 
30 Mann, Thomas E., “Reflections on the 2000 U.S. Presidential Election., The Brookings Institute, 1/1/01, 
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/reflections-on-the-2000-u-s-presidential-election/. 
31 Brady et al., “Law and Data: The Butterfly Ballot Episode”58 
32 Brady et al., “Law and Data: The Butterfly Ballot Episode”,59 
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looked to the courts for a solution. Before the legal ramifications and precedents associated with 
2000 election law are explored, I the problem of the butterfly ballot and in turn the major 
problems that arose on November 7th 2000 must be examined.  
 In preparation for the 2000 Presidential Election, Palm Beach County, Florida decided to 
implement a new ballot format. This ballot, when aligned with the holes for the punch card 
system, did not line up correctly to the candidate, leading to mass confusion among voters.33 
Figure 1.4 provides an example of the ballot used in Palm Beach County. As seen, the punch 
hole that signifies a selection for president is not actually coinciding with the candidate the hole 
represents. This exact reasoning resonates with how other voters perceived the ballot and 
suggests that there was more than a select few who suffered from this confusion. As a result, in 
Palm Beach County, the race between George W. Bush and Al Gore boiled down to 537 ballots 
and ultimately cost Gore the election.34 Calculations by Brady et al., show that about 2,000 
supporters for Gore accidently casted their vote for Buchanan.35 From the 20% of Floridians who 
supported Buchanan, 7% of that support came from Palm Beach County.36 On a similar note, the 
number of overvotes calculated during this election was upwards of 19,000.37 For clarity, an 
overvote occurs when a voter indicates two choices for a contest that only allows for one choice 
to be made.  
 




36 Ibid.  
37 Ibid. 




The researchers also concluded that there was sufficient evidence beyond the doubt of 
circumstance that there was a problem with this election. The authors state the following: 
We find that Buchanan’s Palm Beach County vote total is not merely large but that in 
statistical terms it is extraordinary. Furthermore, we examined voting patterns within 
Palm beach County and find strong statistical evidence that Buchanan voters are 
concentrated in the most liberal precincts of Palm Beach County. We also find that 
invalid, double-punched ballots—presumably double-punched ballots for Gore and 
Buchanan— tend to come from relatively liberal precincts. These two findings are 
evidence for the claim that the ballot format in Palm Beach County led some Gore 
supporters to vote for Buchanan, and in some cases, to vote for multiple presidential 
candidates.38 
 
These findings were alarming at the time and even more distressing 11 years later. The fact that 
the electoral process and voters intent were threatened by a mechanism of elections that is 100% 
controllable is cause for great concern. Even more disturbing are the affidavits stating that voters 
were denied help after asking poll workers to assist with their selection of a candidate due to the 
 
38 Ibid. 
Figure 1.3 Example Ballot from the 2000 Presidential election used in Palm Beach 
County, Florida  
Source: Google 
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confusing nature of the ballot.39 The women’s anecdote goes as follows. She asserts that she was 
familiar with the ballot structure after looking at the ballot before going to vote. This women was 
also a poll worker, leading to the assumption that she knew the ins and outs of the electoral 
process that occurs on election day. This voter claims that she requested assistance from the poll 
worker to ensure she casted her vote for Al Gore. She was denied assistance and was 
embarrassed to ask for further assistance. Instead, the voter punched the hole she believed was 
right. Her husband received further clarification was told to punch the second and third holes to 
indicate Al Gore and his running mate.40 This one example is a clear indication that the butterfly 
ballot made it more difficult for voters to cast their vote as they wished to.  
 The debate on how to handle the situation in Palm Beach County made its way into the 
legal system. Many judges in Florida recused themselves from the case brought to the courts by 
Florida Attorney, David Krathen.41 Looking to the courts for clarity on the 2000 election led to a 
slippery slope. The courts may not have been the best place to look for an answer. The courts 
look at two types of information: Case law that establishes precedent and the State and U.S. 
Constitution. The intricacies of elections and election law thwarted the willingness of judges to 
take on the case presented to the court. For this specific case, judged recused themselves left and 
right because they did not want to be the one to decide a case that was so unprecedented. The 
facts of this case were daunting and having to decide whether a revote was necessary in Palm 
Beach County was a decision that could tarnish their reputation. After a number of recusals, the 




41 Ibid.  
42 Ibid. 
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he was unsure that he had the constitutional authority to order a revote in Palm Beach County.43 
He asked each party to find a case where a revote was ordered during a presidential election and 
there was little out there.44 The argument could be made that aspects of the ballot violated 
Florida law, but highlighting the design flaws of the ballot would not be sufficient to make a 
judge declare it as defective.45  
A few days later, the judge issued his opinion which points out that because of the 
dubious language, which makes up the Constitution required the electors to be elected on the 
same day.46 Since every other state had certified a winner, it would be unsound to allow a revote 
to occur in Palm Beach County. The constitution also contains a clause that represents the fact 
that a revote could provide a disadvantage to one candidate and an advantage to the other which 
would be unconstitutional.47 Brady et al., states an important insight. They state, “The facts of 
the butterfly ballot proclaimed a significant injustice, but the law appeared blind to the problem 
and unable to deal with it.”48 It was recognized that there were flaws in the ballots design, but the 
judge did not find sufficient evidence to challenge the legality of the ballot and as a result, the 
court did not find it defective according to the law.49 This set a damaging precedent and 
threatened the citizens constitutional right to elect officials. By the court not standing up for the 
constitutional right to vote, it put any ability to institute and instill change in how jurisdictions 
administer elections in a compromising condition. 
 The issue of the butterfly ballot brought great attention to the issues of election 
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antiquated voting technology called for the investigation into the improvement of election 
administration. One action taken by the federal government was the creation of new legislation. 
The most notable form of election administration legislation crafted by the United States 
Congress was in 2002. The Help America Vote Act or HAVA aimed to appropriate funds of the 
federal government to state governments to revamp their voting technology and to modernize 
their technology, phasing out punch card systems and lever voting systems. This legislation was 
the Federal response to what occurred during the 2000 election. Besides providing funds to 
advance punch card voting machines and lever voting machines, the HAVA also required state 
election boards and governments to provide voting access to the disabled, created the Election 
Assistance Commission, created an updated voter registration form, and created new guidelines 
for testing and certification protocols for voting machine software and hardware.50 It also called 
for a clearinghouse that aimed to hold resources, information, and mutual practices for states.51 
This step by the federal government was undoubtedly necessary due to the state and local 
governments inability to recognize and facilitate these crucial changes on their own.  
 The HAVA wished to bring about change to a an array of issues within election 
administration. This is important to improve the overall administration of elections, but it is 
especially important for advancing voting technology. Before the HAVA, there was minimal 
legislation enacted by the federal government that focused on voting technology. By starting the 
conversation on the congressional floor, the federal government exemplified their commitment to 
investigating and improving election technology.  
 
50  U.S. Congress, House Committee, Help America Vote Act of 2002, 2. 
51 Election Assistance Commission, “Help America Vote Act”, 
3/12/21,https://www.eac.gov/about_the_eac/help_america_vote_act.aspx   
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 One important condition of the Help America Vote Act relating to voting technology was 
the federal funding provided to states to advance their voting technology from the previously 
noted punch card and lever voting systems. The HAVA provided specific guidelines for how the 
money should be spent, which included abiding by the protocols set forth in the act, education 
for the public on voting standards and voting technology, training those working the polls, and to 
implement some form of voting technology that is usable for those who are disabled.52 The act 
also “required voting systems to allow the voter to review, verify, and change their vote before 
casting it.”53 As noted in The Brennan Center of Justice’s Report on United States voting 
machines, local board of elections do not have the funds to invest in and acquire new voting 
systems.54 Additionally, if the federal government did not act sooner, then the risks associated 
with punch card systems and lever machines would be exacerbated. By the federal government 
providing monetary assistance to state and local governments, jurisdictions were able to make 
the big purchases they needed and take active strides to ensure democracy. 
 On a similar note, the HAVA also provided the disabled with the ability to cast their 
intent by keeping the secret ballot in play. This legislation ensured that a voting machine with 
accessibility features, such as an audio feature and a controller that helps the voter make a 
selection in a contest, which makes it possible for anyone who is disabled to vote without any 
assistance. I can speak for Suffolk County in New York State ensured that these machines were 
programmed and working. The machines used by Suffolk County are pictured below (Figure 
1.5). These machines were produced by Dominion Voting Systems Inc., a well-known producer 
of election equipment. The voting machine pictured below works in the following way. The 
 
52 U.S. Congress, House Committee, Help America Vote Act of 2002, 4 
53 Weinstein-Tull, “Election Law Federalism”, 758 
54 Norden and Famighetti, “America’s Voting machines at Risk”,4 
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controller, which is similar to a Gameboy controller, allows the voter to maneuver through the 
candidates for each contest and select their choice. Figure 1.6 shows how a voter would use the 
controller to “vocalize” their intent of support. Along with this controller, there are headphones 
that connected to the machine allowing the voter to hear directions that assist in navigating the 
voting process. For those who are paralyzed or are unable to use the controller, there is a tube 
that attaches to the machine allowing the voter to use the force of their breath to pick their 
candidate for a given contest. The HAVA paved the way for those who are disabled to cast their 





Figure 1.4 Representation of a Tabulator that can be used by the disabled. 
Source: Google 




 The establishment of the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) was essential to 
establishing a stronger relationship between the federal government and state and local 
jurisdictions. The EAC was created to act as a gateway to advisory panels and guidelines that 
were standard to Federal elections.55 The EAC worked to create voluntary voting equipment 
guidelines and to ensure that the “clearinghouse of information” was accessible to state and local 
governments, so they could find all guidelines and recommendations.56 This action taken by 
Congress is a step in the right direction to unify the approach to Federal elections taken on by 
state and local governments. One major drawback is that the protocols produced by the EAC 
were and still are voluntary, meaning that states and local jurisdictions could use discretion when 
 
55 U.S. Congress, House Committee, Help America Vote Act of 2002, 4 
56 Ibid.  
Figure 1.5 Diagram of controller with explanations on usage. 
Source: Google 
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choosing what to implement and if they implement these suggestions at all. The theoretical 
framework of electoral federalism, which is discussed in the next section, helps explain the intent 
of this arrangement.  
 In order to safeguard the transition to new technologies, there needed to be guidelines 
that explicitly pointed jurisdictions in the right direction when making these decisions. The 
committee commenced by HAVA, the Technical Guidelines Development Committee, intended 
to create guidelines for voting technology and its machinery.57 Even if these guidelines are not 
adapted by all 50 states, the establishment of these guidelines is an important statement and 
commitment to advancing election technology. The HAVA exemplifies the commitment of the 
federal government to ensure the quality of U.S. elections.  
1.3 Election Federalism 
 The standards associated with the certification and verification of election technology is 
dependent on the statues, laws and regulations imposed by local governments, state 
governments, and the federal government. This convoluted, jurisdictional relationship between 
all levels of government is the result of election federalism. According to Weinstein-Tull, 
election federalism has two recognizable attributes. These attributes are categorized as, “(1) 
unusually expansive federal power to legislate pursuant to the Election Clause; and (2) 
widespread state prerogative to delegate election responsibilities to local government.”58 
Weinstein-Tull argues that election law federalism encompasses two apparent features- the wide 
power of the federal infrastructure to regulate and the state’s privilege to delegate responsibility 
to local jurisdictions.59 This definition leads to a number of different analyses when it comes to 
 
57 U.S. Congress, House Committee, Help America Vote Act of 2002,17 
58 Weinstein-Tull, Election Law Federalism,1 
59 Weinstein-Tull, Election Law Federalism, 775 
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deciphering what parts of the electoral process are under each level of government’s jurisdiction. 
The Election Clause in the United States Constitution states “The Times, Places, and Manner of 
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the 
Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, 
except as to the Places of chusing Senators.”60 The creators of the Constitution aimed to give 
state governments a majority of the control when deciding how to administer elections. They 
also realized that the federal government (the legislative body) should be able to “check” other 
governing bodies and maintain the capacity to pass laws to assist in the process. The Founders 
intended for the Election Clause to give power to the states to plan elections according to their 
own specific procedures and nothing more.61  
This interpretation of the Election Clause of the U.S. Constitution gives state 
governments immeasurable power when it comes to the administration of elections. As a result, 
the federal government has little control over how states choose to conduct elections. The 
Framers envisioned the Election Clause to operate in this manner because with so many 
jurisdictions, it would be impossible for the federal government to administer elections across the 
country and do it well. Currently, there are 3,006 counties located in the United States.62 If the 
federal government took on the burden of preparing elections across each state and within each 
county, there would be a number of significant challenges to overcome. Additionally, Weinstein-
Tull calls elections “hyperfederalized”; that is, many key election decisions are made at the local 
level.”63 It is also important to note that election administration is not a high-ranked or important 
 
60 United States Constitution, art 1. sect.1, clause 1 
61 Constitution Annotated, “Art.S4.C1.1.1.1.1. Role of the States in Regulating Federal Elections”,3/12/21, 
constitution.congress.gov. 
62 U.S. Census, “States, Counties, and Statistically Equivalent Entities”. 3/12/21. 
https://www2.census.gov/geo/pdfs/reference/GARM/Ch4GARM.pdf 
63 Weinstein-Tull, “Election Law Federalism”, 752 
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issue of the federal government. This is one reason why the federal government delegates 
election administration to state governments. This transfer of responsibility helps ensure that 
elections are ran in accordance to federal and state law, since each state has their own laws and 
policies for administering elections. State governments further delegate these responsibilities to 
local governments. Local governments are tasked with carrying out the election administration 
from voter registration to the tabulation and certification of votes. Theoretically, the hierarchy of 
election administration used today should operate in a way that produces few issues. Each county 
will carry out elections as they see fit, keeping in mind the needs of their constituents and current 
election law. One concern that arises when looking at elections is that there are 3,006 different 
methods used. With each county having their own distinct ways of operating, there are many 
discrepancies that occur between counties and states. This may be appropriate for electing for 
local and state elections, but, for electing officials to the House, Senate, and Presidency, it may 
not be the best method. Interpretations of the Election Clause leads to the conclusions that it is up 
to state and therein local governments to administer state and local elections as they wish. But, 
the federal government has clear jurisdiction over the administration of federal elections and the 
federal government can require states to adapt its wishes. An example of this occurred in 2002 
with the federal government requiring states to phase out punch card and lever voting systems. 
Indeed, they provided the funds for this advancement, but by doing so, the federal government 
was able to appeal to states to make the change. A similar application of this action was seen in 
1984 when the federal government tied increasing the legal drinking age from 18 to 21 to federal 
funding for state highways.64 Although it is not in the same realm of government administration, 
the application of this principle is sound. The notion that the federal government could use 
 
64Alcohol Policy Information System, “The 1984 National Minimum Drinking Age Act”, 3.12.21. 
https://alcoholpolicy.niaaa.nih.gov/the-1984-national-minimum-drinking-age-act. 
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money and other incentives as bait for states to follow their preferred course of action represents 
a clear economic power that the federal government holds compared to the “power” of state 
governments. The amount of money the federal government was able to provide to states for 
voting equipment was substantial and enough to cause jurisdictions to comply. 
  Election federalism takes into consideration the rights of each aspect of government and 
as a result, appears to be the most beneficial approach to election administration. Indeed, there 
are a number of different issues that arise within this infrastructure. Given that states could be at 
odds with the wishes of the federal government, they could choose to not hold up their end and 
not implement federal policies. This occurred in 2005 with the state of Alabama, not due to 
opposition of the legislation, but due to the fact the Attorney General felt the state did not have 
the authority to do so. Weinstein-Tull states,  
In 2005, the Alabama attorney general issued an opinion stating that the Alabama 
secretary of state did not have the authority to select a particular voting system or 
designate a set of acceptable systems for Alabama counties in order to comply with 
HAVA. Nor did the secretary of state, according to the opinion, have the authority to 
prevent the counties from purchasing certain systems. When Alabama proposed a new 
law that would permit the secretary of state to select the available voting machines for the 
counties, county officials objected to surrendering the authority that they had long 
possessed. Alabama did ultimately enact that legislation, and brought the state into 
compliance with HAVA. The Alabama attorney general opinion demonstrates Alabama’s 
genuine belief that it lacked the ability to comply with HAVA until it enacted 
implementing legislation—that is, a belief that HAVA itself did not give Alabama 
sufficient authority to comply with its terms.65 
The Alabama attorney general’s opinion brings attention to a fallacy of election federalism. Just 
because the federal government passes legislation that gives states the power to implement the 
federal government’s wishes, there are other factors that thwart such advancement. Since 
counties are tasked with implementing voting technology, there was resistance by the state to 
 
65 Weinstein-Tull, “Election Law Federalism”, 769 
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start the process of phasing out lever and punch card voting machines. The fact that the attorney 
general felt that the secretary of state did not have the right to implement the act on a state level 
shows how laws and state constitutions can have an adverse effect on elections when states are in 
competition with each other. Election federalism makes it extremely difficult to make 
advancements in election administration because of the many players involved. In addition to the 
obstacle of implementing new policies, there is a lack of accountability between the levels of 
government. States use the organization of election administration to scapegoat and escape 
accountability by blaming county governments or by claiming that the laws of the state forbid 
them to act.66 
 In a similar realm, state governments can make it extremely difficult for local 
jurisdictions to administer their part of the electoral process, whether it is done on purpose or as 
an unforeseen consequence. This was the case with the State of New York and Nassau and 
Putnam County. The Albany County Board of Elections wrote a memo which spoke to the 
challenges the law placed on counties. Weinstein-Tull remarks, “The State has made compliance 
impossible by failing to certify a list of approved voting systems in sufficient time for local 
boards to undertake all the necessary preparations for an orderly transition to the new 
machines.”67 It was suggested that the time requirement set by the Help America Vote Act, to 
have the new technology implemented by the 2007 Primary Election, made it impossible for 
counties to implement the changes before New York State tested the security of these 
machines.68 Putnam County stood to lose a momentous amount of funding because the county 
 
66 Weinstein-Tull, “Election Law Federalism” 770 
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was unable to implement these changes due to the states failure to act.69 In a similar light, Nassau 
County echoed the same argument, arguing that it was New York State’s responsibility to 
comply with the act and they failed to do so.70 The jurisdictional relationship between state and 
local governments leads to a lack of accountability that is detrimental to election administration 
and to democracy. The State further delegates election responsibilities to county governments, 
but does not yield the duty to be held accountable as they are the jurisdiction that further 
prescribes the authority of election administration to counties. In this case, the state of New York 
was at fault for not providing the necessary certifications and support for local jurisdictions. This 
echoes the numerous types of issues that arise when each level of government fails to work 
together and instead figures that another level of government would pick up the slack and make 
up for it. 
 Election federalism plays a critical role in the administration of elections. As seen with 
the implementation of the Help America Vote Act, the challenges of delegating of election 
responsibilities cause harm when the efforts are coordinated, but rather in competition with each 
other. This section provides a historical explanation to uncover the innerworkings of election 
administration based on the intent of the framework of the United States Constitution. Analyzing 
the role of election federalism in the overall infrastructure of elections, I argue, creates the 
necessary framework to analyze voting technology and the issues it continues to cause with the 
overall voting process. There needs to be better cooperation between all levels of government 
when implementing new policies and regulations. Federalism was not instituted to segregate the 
hierarchy of government. The Founders understood that state governments needed a prominent 
voice in the governing process, but they did not intend for different levels of government to stand 
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back from their duties, burdening lower levels of government. Governing the electoral process is 
too large and too important to be a one level responsibility and the burden of election 
administration will lie one level of government if this delegation continues.  
 The history of voting technology is essential to our understanding of election 
administration. A historical perspective provides a gateway to a plethora of analyses to be made 
as well as to the political circumstances that sparked these important conversations and 
improvements. As the sequence of events personifies, voting technology ranges in specificity and 
purpose. It also speaks to the amazing advancements that have been made to ensure that the 
voters’ intent is heard and that elections are ran smoothly and accurately. It is notable to 
recognize the path the process of election administration took to advance voting technology to 
where it is today. Since the times of the paper ballot, elections have been able to make 
remarkable progress, creating machines that accommodate those with disabilities as well making 
the process of casting a vote fairly easy. As election technology got more advanced, problems 
arose with its implementation which has lasting effects still to this today. 
 The crisis that was a result of the 2000 Presidential Election was a wake-up call to all 
about the fragility of the electoral process. The fact that an entire election was undermined by the 
structure of a ballot in one county is astonishing.  This issue made it clear that something in the 
election process needed to be changed. The Help America Vote Act was a monumental act that 
led to many conversations about the necessary changes that needed to occur in order to update 
outdated voting technologies such as the lever voting machines and the punch card voting 
machines. In turn, election federalism helps explain the complexities of election administration, 
highlighting the many jurisdictions that are a part of the process. It leads to a lack of 
accountability from different levels of government adding to issues with election administration. 
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Although it is grounded in the United States Constitution, the application of federalism in 
election administration may do more harm than good and needs to be re-evaluated. 
1.4 Election Technology As A Political Phenomenon 
The ability of citizens and elected members of American society to debate, share 
concerns, and work together to achieve prosperity is fundamentally the practice of politics. It is 
defined by its reliance on a power differential between citizens and elected officials at every 
level of government- from local towns and villages to the most powerful positions in the United 
States’ government. Many theories of democracy explore the relations between citizens and 
forms of government, which seek to justify and explain why choosing elected officials to 
represent citizens’ desires and needs works. Democratic practices in the United States 
government leads, in theory, to being represented and heard. The means to this end are reliant on 
one democratic process that is often taken for granted: elections. The electoral process requires a 
medium that takes voter intent and transcribes it into a counted vote. This tangible medium, 
rather than the inherent systems that create electoral systems of administration, is election 
technology. This section seeks to argue and explain how election technology is a political entity 
and how its problems are untimely cured by practicing politics.  
As previously mentioned that the research and development of voting technologies is 
carried out by private companies, free from the influence of political groups and organizations. 
Because the advancement of such technology is funded by private entities, it is not tied to the 
political apparatus of the United States. Although it appears on the surface that private 
companies such as Dominion Voting Systems Inc.71 or Election Systems & Software, LLC 
 
71 U.S. Election Assistance Commission, “Dominion Voting Systems Inc.” 3/12/21, https://www.eac.gov/voting-
equipment/registered-manufacturers/election-systems-software-inc-ess 
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(ES&S)72 are responsible for such advancement, they are subjected to adhere to regulations and 
requirements created by the U.S. government. Additionally, voting machines created by private 
companies are used in government sanctioned processes. Based on this logic, voting technology 
is an issue of the body politic. The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) and its updated 
requirements for voting machines demonstrates this point. The HAVA, passed in 2002, required 
the phasing out of lever voting machines and punch card voting machines that led to the 
disastrous problem in Palm Beach County, Florida. This had a direct effect on these private 
companies because it changed the market for voting technologies. As time passed and the older 
technologies were phased out, the shift in market demand to a need for more advanced voting 
technologies. If it were not for this piece of election legislation, private companies would not be 
as motivated to invest in research and development to create new voting technologies.  
The government, on a system level, interacts politically with election technology 
manufactures, making the relationship political. It is also elected officials and political groups 
that make voting technology a political issue. The recent actions taken by President Trump, the 
Trump Campaign and its allies in the 2020 Presidential Election to spread a misinformation 
campaign to discredit Dominion Voting Systems Inc. because President Trump lost the election 
is a political issue. To preface the subsequent argument, former President Donald Trump lost the 
popular vote 46.91% to President Joe Biden who obtained 51.38% of the popular vote.73 In terms 
of the Electoral College vote, former President Trump lost to President Biden who obtained 306 
electoral votes to Trump’s 236 votes.74 Additionally, the Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security 
Agency (CISA) released a statement declaring the following: 
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The November 3rd election was the most secure in American history. Right now, across 
the country, election officials are reviewing and double checking the entire election 
process prior to finalizing the result. When states have close elections, many will recount 
ballots. All of the states with close results in the 2020 presidential race have paper 
records of each vote, allowing the ability to go back and count each ballot if necessary. 
This is an added benefit for security and resilience. This process allows for the 
identification and correction of any mistakes or errors. There is no evidence that any 
voting system deleted or lost votes, changed votes, or was in any way compromised.  
Other security measures like pre-election testing, state certification of voting equipment, 
and the U.S. Election Assistance Commission’s (EAC) certification of voting equipment 
help to build additional confidence in the voting systems used in 2020.  
While we know there are many unfounded claims and opportunities for misinformation 
about the process of our elections, we can assure you we have the utmost confidence in 
the security and integrity of our elections, and you should too. When you have questions, 
turn to elections officials as trusted voices as they administer elections.75 
In the days leading up to November 3, President Trump, with the help of his allies such as his 
private legal counsel Rudy Giuliani, Sidney Powell and news organizations like Fox News, 
claimed that if he was going to lose the election, it would be due to widespread election fraud.76 
They blatantly ignored the facts presented by numerous agencies of both state and federal 
governments. They prepared their response in case they lost the election. In the days after the 
Associated Press declared a winner of the 2020 Presidential Election, former President Trump 
and his co-actors went rampant with accusations that Dominion Voting Systems Inc. flipped 
votes to Joe Biden.77 The former president himself, as well as the others mentioned above, 
barked inaccurate claims in press conferences, appearances on news segments, and postings on 
social media (Twitter) that directly undermined the results of the election and the reputation of 
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Dominion Voting Systems Inc., since a portion of the public (Trump supporters) believed these 
false claims.  
As a result, Dominion Voting Systems Inc. filed a lawsuit against Rudolph Giuliani, 
Sidney Powell, Mike Lindell, and Fox News based on the grounds of defamation. The New York 
times says the following about the case against Giuliani-- 
The suit seeks damages of more than $1.3 billion and is based on more than 50 
statements Mr. Giuliani made at legislative hearings, on Twitter, on his podcast and in the 
conservative news media, where he spun a fictitious narrative of a plot by one of the 
biggest voting machine manufacturers in the country to flip votes to President Biden.”78  
One false claim plastered across the internet and voiced by the defendants is that Dominion has 
ties to a Venezuelan Dictator and was started in the country to fix the results of the Venezuelan 
election of Hugo Chávez.79 Another lie that was shared by the defendants was that an employee 
of Dominion Voting Systems Inc. was a part of the terrorist group, ANTIFA.80 The brunt of the 
blame was placed on Eric Coomer, the Director of Product Strategy and Security for Dominion 
Voting Systems Inc.81 Oltmann, a defendant of the case brought on by Dr. Coomer, took the 
issue to a Conservative Daily Podcast, stating,  
Let’s not sugar coat this, we’re going to expose someone inside of Dominion Voting 
Systems specifically related to Antifa and related to someone that is so far left and is 
controlling the elections, and his fingerprints are in every state. So I want you guys to 
understand that what we’re about to show you, you have to share . . . The conversation 
will be about a man named Eric Coomer. C-O-O-M-E-R.82 
 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid.  
80 Ibid. 
81 Eric Coomer,Ph.D, vs. Donald J. Trump For President, Inc., Sidney Powell, Sidney Powell, p.c., Rudolph 
Giuliani, Joseph Oltmann, FEC United, Shuffling Madness Media, Inc. dba Conservative Daily, James Hoft, TGP 
Communications LLC dba The Gateway Pundit, Michelle Malkin, Eric Metaxas, Chanel Rion, Herring Networks, 
Inc. dba One America News Network, and Newsmax Media, Inc.,5 
82Eric Coomer,Ph.D, vs. Donald J. Trump For President, Inc., Sidney Powell, Sidney Powell, p.c., Rudolph Giuliani, 
Joseph Oltmann, FEC United, Shuffling Madness Media, Inc. dba Conservative Daily, James Hoft, TGP 
Communications LLC dba The Gateway Pundit, Michelle Malkin, Eric Metaxas, Chanel Rion, Herring Networks, 
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This is only one example of the many accounts of the misinformation campaign that occurred 
before, during , and after the 2020 Election. The actions taken by these parties undermined the 
results of the election, causing many citizens to doubt the electoral process.  
By targeting voting technology and its reliability as the main culprit of fraud, the Trump 
Campaign and its allies threatened democracy. As a result of the former presidents’ incapability 
to accept his fate, the entire electoral process was questioned. If that is not a political issue, what 
is. Calling the United States electoral process fraudulent undermined the authority of the 
government to carry out fair elections as well and brought doubt about the results of the election. 
Voting technology is tied to the process by which citizens choose elected officials to represent 
their political needs and desires. Voting technology is no doubt an infrastructure that needs to be 
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Chapter 2: Ethnographic Account of My Experience at the Suffolk County BOE 
My time at the Suffolk County Board of Elections (SCOBE)  contributed to the creation 
of this topic and to my basic understanding of voting technology. In this regard, the experiences I 
bring attention to are strictly observational. I bring a unique perspective to the issues facing 
election technology and its administration. I was not a long-term employee of the Suffolk County 
Board of Elections, allowing me to see a different perspective than other employees. Many 
employees worked at the BOE for decades and it was noticeable that they got bogged-down in 
the office culture and BOE operations. In short, many employees overlooked ways to reach 
optimum productivity and often times settled with methods they employed to complete their 
tasks. As a short-term employee of the Suffolk County Board of Elections, I was able to take a 
step back from the office politics and truly see the BOE operate in its truest form. This chapter 
will explore my experiences during my first “stint” at the Suffolk County Board of Elections. In 
the subsequent pages, I will delve into the office culture, my relationships with other employees, 
and my overall observations of how tasks are carried out. 
 I had gotten the opportunity to intern at the Suffolk County Board of Elections through 
my father. The Republican Commissioner, is a law student at the same Law School my father 
attended. The Commissioner reached out to my father to help him with some classwork and they 
became contacts and colleagues. My dad mentioned to him that I was a Political Science major at 
Union College and had an interest in law. That summer I had shoulder surgery and was unable to 
adhere to the requirements of a full time internship. I was in a immobilization sling for two 
months and with the demand of physical therapy and not being able to drive, it was safer for me 
to remain at home. This internship at the Suffolk County Board of Elections was the perfect 
 Blaustein 39 
opportunity for me to gain more experience in the legal field as well as in the field of public 
service and local government, while still making my recovery a priority.  
2.1 SCOBE Office Culture 
The Suffolk County Board of Elections is located in Yaphank, New York. It is an older 
building off of a major roadway surrounded by the Health Department, the Sherriff’s office, and 
other county government buildings. The SCOBE is a bi-partisan office, meaning that there were 
both Republican and Democrat “sides” to everything the BOE did. I worked for the Republicans, 
and was responsible only to the Republican administrators. Every action taken was carried out in 
a bi-partisan manner. A Democrat and Republican would work in tandem with each other, 
whether they were sitting at the front desk as the receptionist or if they were processing absentee 
ballots. Every major decision was made by both Democrat and Republican leaders. The 
hierarchy of the BOE was simple, but had drastic effects on office culture. Both sides (Democrat 
and Republican) had a Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, Senior Assistant Commissioner, 
and an Assistant Commissioner. In the front office there were also assistants and office 
managers. Although not all those roles were filled, there were a handful of individuals who you 
knew were in charge. The rest of the employees at the BOE worked in different areas or 
departments. They ranged from the warehouse where they worked on voting machines, those 
who managed voter registration records, those who processed and manually implemented 
records, and those who were responsible absentee ballots. Within each department there was a 
Democrat and Republican who acted as the team leader, managing other employees within the 
department. Both those in charge and those at the bottom of the hierarchy often had to 
compromise and debate over certain issues and plans of action.  
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The bipartisan nature of the BOE created a tense environment at times. Very early on I 
learned who belonged to each party and the implications this label had on the work relationships 
in the BOE. I found that the Democrats were in the company of other Democrats while 
Republicans did the same. There was awkward tension between some individuals of different 
parties which was apparent an hour into my internship. When something went wrong, some were 
quick to place blame on those of the opposite party. This occurred a number of different times. I 
would contribute this to the employees’ increased sense of partisanship which made them lose 
focus on the big picture which was that they were working for the greater good and for a greater 
cause.  
It was also apparent that I was one of the most educated in the back office. Very few 
employees had a college degree. Most has some level of education but many others just had a 
high school education. As someone who was more tech savvy and in college, I approached 
problems differently and was able to change the way in which tasks were approached. For 
example, I was creating poll worker books for each early voting polling place. It was to be done 
by hand. I was tasked with drawing lines on a paper, making sure that it was neat and legible. I 
was given a guide to follow, but that was little help. The BOE was getting close to the start of 
Early Voting, working twelve hour days to ensure that everything was ready. It took me about 
six hours to get the lines and spacing perfect. When I went to show my supervisor, they changed 
the format but didn’t tell me. So back to the drawing board I went. By 7pm, I was done 
reworking the book. I turned to the supervisors and said “You know, I could of done this on 
Excel and had it done in fifteen minutes.” They were so surprised and said that whenever I had a 
new idea or a quicker way to get things done, to tell them. This is when I realized that the reason 
why the BOE carried out tasks the way they did was not because they were opposed to 
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innovation, it was because if the process wasn’t flawed, there was no reason to fix it. This theme 
became apparent in many of the initiatives taken on by the BOE.  
2.2 My Experiences and Observations 
I worked in the Inspector’s Office which was tasked with training and coordinating poll 
workers for each town and each polling place. This department was also responsible for ensuring 
that poll workers were paid for their training for the time they put in during early voting and 
election day. There were different levels of poll workers and their level was decided by a 
percentage identifying how well they performed in past elections. The best were designated as 
chairs and the ranged from coordinators to assistants. This hierarchy echoes the hierarchy that is 
experienced working at the Suffolk County Board of Elections.  
My first stint at the SCOBE was two weeks long in August of 2019. I worked regular 
hours, 9am to 5pm. My other stint was for the month of June in 2020, during the Coronavirus 
pandemic. I will touch on this time period more specifically in the next section. During June 
2020, I worked weekdays for 10-12 hours a day, weekends for a few hours, and on election day I 
worked from 4:40 AM to around 10:30 PM, leaving only because one of the police officers had 
COVID and I didn’t want to be exposed to the people the officer had been around. I often came 
in early and was last to leave my department. I was given the option to not work on the weekend, 
but happily did. Working the 2020 Primary was a one in a lifetime opportunity and I was happy 
to give up my weekends to watch it all unfold. The more seasoned workers at the SCOBE were 
able to leave at 4pm and those who were just starting work had to arrive at 8:30am and were able 
to leave at 4:30pm. Although I was considered a “new worker” it was clear from the start that I 
would be allowed to come and go as I pleased and was given more leeway in terms of what I did 
around the office. For starters, I often times would be pulled away from my desk to complete 
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special tasks such as research for the Republican Assistant Commissioner or to listen in on the 
Commissioner and his team read through contracts. The Republican Deputy Commissioner went 
above and beyond to show me things she believed I would be interested in and showed me the 
cases she was working on. It didn’t matter what I was doing, if they called me up to the front, I 
went. Alongside the access and exposure I was provided with, I received another luxury, the use 
of the internet. Back office employees did not get access to an internet browser. At the start of 
my internship, I did not have access to the internet. I needed it to work on a project for the 
commissioner and in five minutes, I had it. 
When others in my department found out that I had received internet access, many did 
not care. One employee did have lot to say about it. This employee’s work ethic mimicked the 
work ethic of the many who worked there. There was a saying that meandered its way across the 
departments of the Suffolk County Bord of Elections. It was “work on county time.” I was told 
this early on, that those I worked with advocated and pushed me to work slower than I intended 
to. It seemed to become the anthem of the seasoned workers of the BOE. This women did the 
bare minimum. With every assignment given, she would procrastinate. She would spend most of 
the day on her phone and complain about the work she did not complete. When the deadlines got 
close, she would still manage to complain while rushing to complete her work. One day, I was 
working on a project that required me to research and provide synopses of new election 
legislation that was recently passed for the Assistant Commissioner. My co-worker peered in my 
direction and saw what I was doing. She angerly asked what I was doing and how I managed to 
get internet service, given that I was an intern and in her eyes lowest on the totem pole. Before I 
could answer, she went on a 30 minute angered rant about how she has worked for the BOE for 
over 20 years and believes that she is entitled to have internet access. She further explained that 
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she should have internet access so she can pay her bills. The BOE is known to have terrible 
phone service as well, leading to her added difficulty of paying her bills from her desk. I started 
to realize that not giving internet access to all employees was the right call. Many employees 
would take advantage of it and use it to further procrastinate their work.  
Beyond this one employee, there were a small amount of people in the Inspectors 
Department who partook in the same antics as this employee. It had a negative effect on the 
output of the department’s work. The supervisors had to constantly remind other employees to 
do their work. In my department specifically, there were three employees that were famous for 
leaving their desk for hours. They would walk in and when questioned where they were, they 
were ambiguous with their answers. Their work was for the same town and it rarely got done on 
time without help from the supervisors or from myself. I viewed this behavior as laziness, but 
then came to realize that the structure and organization of the Board of Elections partially 
contributed to these behaviors.  
At times, the work at the BOE was scarce for some departments, while other departments 
were bombarded with work. When there was not a lot of work to be assigned, people sat on their 
phones. Very few were proactive about finding work. Additionally, when there were tasks that 
involved more than one department, many hid in their perspective areas, hoping to escape work. 
I rarely saw an employee offer assistance to one another and the burden was on the supervisors 
of each department to ensure that their department was meeting the expectations of the 
commissioners. It was apparent that the stress often times lead to tension which resulted in 
certain employees putting in less effort than before. Many in my department would leave when 
they were needed the most. The work pace was already slow at the BOE, but when they left the 
work was always completed by those who stayed.  
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2.3 2019 Early Voting Experience 
When we were preparing for Early Voting in 2019, it was the first time Early Voting was 
implemented in New York State. The Early Voting legislation was passed by the NYS Senate in 
January of 2019.83 The hopes of this bill was to lessen the wait times for voters during election 
day and to provide more opportunities for citizens to cast their vote.84 It was clear that everything 
we did was trial and error. There was no specific way to implement Early Voting practices in 
Suffolk County and the commissioners were tasked with figuring it out. The inspectors office 
was tasked with finding poll workers to work the Early Voting locations. At first, the hardest task 
was to convince people to sign up for ten days of Early Voting. And for me, the hardest task was 
to learn the ins and outs of this new legislation quickly and to be able to explain it to the poll 
workers. What amazed me was the knowledge set held by employees, not from formal education, 
but from the experiences they’ve had. 
 For days we worked on securing poll workers to work the 10 days of Early Voting. Over 
this time period, I learned a lot about the relationships those in my department had with the poll 
workers employed by the BOE. Many of these poll workers were long-term workers. The 
majority of poll workers I dealt with were older. They had an understanding of what their duties 
were, but many faced difficulty with voting machines and other technologies implemented at the 
voting site. Fortunately, NYS law requires BOE employees to be at every early voting location.85 
Having BOE employees at the polling site insures that things run smoothly and that if there are 
any problems, there are people who can fix them or call the right person to fix them.  
 
83 NYS Senate Bill S.1101, Pg.1 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid 
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Our main task during Early Voting was to coordinate between poll workers that called us 
with problems that had to be fixed by the other employees on the road and as well as those at the 
polling place. What made the process go smoothly was the knowledge set held by my co-workers 
and the relationships they had with those who worked the polls. As the election cycles went by, 
poll workers became friendly with the staff, often times having long, casual conversations with 
them. When they called and I answered, I got asked several questions as to who I was and what I 
was doing there. This wasn’t meant to be malicious, but it was sometimes clear they would rather 
speak to their direct representative than me. It took about a week for the poll workers to be 
comfortable talking to me. Once they were comfortable, I would hear countless anecdotes about 
what being a part of the electoral process meant to them. I remember one phone call vividly. I 
received a call from an assistant coordinator who was very interested in working Early Voting. 
After I explained to him the ins and outs of what would be required, he talked to me for twenty 
minutes about how much he loves participating in the democratic process and how much he 
loves democracy. Although this conversation for me was mundane, I appreciated his sentiment. I 
appreciated his words not because I had to but because it was a feeling I rarely saw from those 
who worked for the BOE. The employees were bogged down by their partisanship which in turn, 
clouded their perceptions on what the electoral process is clearly about. 
My first stint at the Suffolk County Board Of Elections opened my eyes to the electoral 
process. Just in two weeks I was able to see a side of elections that few people see. The nature of 
election administration is schizophrenic. To outsiders, the process, rules, regulations, and flaws 
are simplified or inherently unknown. Before this experience, I had little knowledge of what an 
election entailed: the bipartisanship nature, the vast number of laws that guide the electoral 
process, and the actual process of counting ballots. I thought the process ended at the polls—the 
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votes were casted and then there was a winner. There is so much more to elections than citizens 
see through the media as well as with our own voting experiences.  
2.4 Second Work Period at the Suffolk County BOE 
Like the first section of this chapter, this section focuses on the second part of my 
experiences at the Suffolk County Board of Elections. The time that I spent there, this time 
around, was vastly different than my first experience at the SCBOE. The most salient reason can 
be attributed to the fact that the world was in the midst of the coronavirus pandemic. In this 
chapter, I will share my experiences in helping prepare for the 2020 Democratic Primary in 
Suffolk County. I will share how the office culture has changed due to the impact of COVID-19 
as well as my experiences working with voting technology. 
2.5 COVID-19 and its Effects on the SCOBE 
It was the beginning of June and the BOE had been closed since the start of the 
Coronavirus pandemic. The 2020 Primary was moved from April 28, 2020 to June 23, 202086 
due to the increased risk of spreading COVID-19 at the polls. Late May, approximately two days 
before the start of June, my dad received a phone call from the Republican Commissioner asking 
if I would like to work for the month of June at the BOE. They were way behind in their 
preparations and needed all the help they could get. It was the second to last week of the spring 
trimester, but I was willing to commit to late nights of studying for this once in a lifetime 
opportunity. That Monday, I reported to Yaphank, NY and was ready to help prepare for the 
primary election.  
 
86 Williams and Dybdahl, “2020 State Primary Election Dates”, 11/3/20,https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-
and-campaigns/2020-state-primary-election-dates.aspx#Alphabetical 
 
 Blaustein 47 
When I walked in, the room was filled with scared, stressed out employees. The first 
thing came to my mind was how would we be able to accomplish all that the SCOBE had to do 
given the primary election was on the horizon. Many shared the fear that going to work would 
mean exposure to the coronavirus and it was a concern of mine as well. The precautions that 
were in place were rarely followed. People worked on top of each other and maintaining a six-
foot separation was difficult, since the office space was not laid out for this type of work. When 
working with the ballots, we had to work in pairs and that meant being less than six feet away 
from your partner. If an employee was uncomfortable with this layout, they did not have to 
participate. During my time, there was only one employee who was neurotic about social 
distancing and mask wearing. I was careful. I always wore my mask and took it off to eat or 
drink. I sanitized my hands multiple times an hour and wore gloves when touching absentee 
ballots. My supervisor poked fun at my habits, and I would joke back and tell him that he wished 
he had my supply of Purell. Many employees took their masks off at their desks which added to 
the concern that the coronavirus would spread. It was apparent that many did not take the rules 
and regulations seriously while others were more careful about the public health crisis. This was 
apparent and it undoubtedly played a role in the chaotic feel of the BOE.  
2.6 Election Preparations and  Office Culture 
 When Governor Cuomo extended absentee voting for all New Yorkers for the 2020 
Primary, it created a vast surge of absentee ballots that needed to be processed. The governor 
signed this executive order to prevent long lines from occurring at polling places, as it increased 
the risk of exposure to the coronavirus.87 This was the right call, but it presented the BOE with 
 
87 Khurshid, Samar, “Cuomo Annoucnes Absentee Voting for All in June; What to Know”, Gathom Gazzete, 
4/6/20,https://www.gothamgazette.com/state/9299-cuomo-expands-absentee-voting-june-2020-what-to-know-new-
york 
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unique challenges. One challenge was waiting on the postal service to process the mail as well as 
ensuring that the mail was sorted through in accordance to NYS election law. There were 
designated people, mostly temporary employees who were employed to help out with the pre-
election to-do list, which included examining these ballots. They were tasked with opening the 
envelope and separating the mail envelope and the oath envelope that contained the ballot(s). 
This was a tedious and long task that lasted for days. It needed to be done in a bi-partisan 
manner, which meant more workers around each other. I should preface this by saying that the 
tension spread to the front office and it was especially noticeable on the Democratic “side.” One 
vivid memory was when the Democratic office manager/assistant commissioner walked into my 
department. I was working next to the Republican supervisor on my own laptop waiting to be 
told what to do. The room where the ballots were was packed with people. Rather than the 
supervisor throwing me in with the ballots and the people, he was preparing something for me to 
do. The office manager proceeds to question me. She demanded to know what I was doing. Not 
knowing that I did not have to report to her, I told her I was working on some work for class 
while I waited for something to do. This wasn’t uncommon for me to do when I had downtime. 
Previously, I would study for the LSAT while waiting for more work, which was better than 
what other employees were doing. She started to yell at me and then storm off. I was shocked by 
the way she handled the situation. She ended up going straight to the Republican Commissioner 
and told him I wasn’t working. As a precaution, he emailed the supervisor and told him to keep 
me busy so I wasn’t in that situation again. There were many times that the Republican staff 
would walk by and see me studying, but knew that once a phone rang or if there was something 
to do, I would stop everything to handle it. This situation and others made me recognize the role 
partisanship played in the workplace. I should mention that at the end of my time at the BOE she 
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praised me, called me a good worker, and didn’t want me to leave. She realized she was quick to 
judge me, which I think shows another common theme of the BOE.  
For many, partisanship was the first attribute of a person they looked at. I was praised by 
other employees for working for the Republican Party. They would constantly say “Welcome to 
the right side” or ‘You made a right choice” without knowing my political beliefs. They just 
assumed my position based on my affiliation at the BOE. Partisanship was also heightened by 
the need for everything to be done in a bi-partisan manner. New York State election law states 
that ballots need to be handled by a Democrat and a Republican. This made the label of 
Democrat and Republican a salient identifier to the employees of the BOE. The absentee ballots 
took days to go through. While the temporary employees were sorting through the ballots, I was 
tasked with mailing out letters to all the poll-workers explaining their assignments for the 
primary election and a paper containing the link for a video containing COVID guidelines for the 
poll-workers to watch. This task was easy, but there were numerous obstacles. As I mentioned 
previously, there were a few employees who were notorious for not doing their work in a timely 
manner. I had to wait for the last town to be done until I was able to send them out. These letters 
had to go out far before we got to them, and it was because these employees chose to take smoke 
breaks and complete other activities outside of the BOE. I ended up finishing the work because 
of how time sensitive the task was. The person whose work I finished offered to buy be lunch. I 
was appalled by this offer since I knew that he knew he was wrong. This is in part how the BOE 
worked. Those who went above in terms of their work often made up for the “slackers” of the 
BOE workforce.  
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2.7 My Experience With Election Technology 
One important task I helped oversee was the scanning of absentee ballots. There were 
about 80,000 ballots that were sent to the BOE by voters. The front office needed to come up 
with a way to manage the ballots as well as make sure they qualified. Qualifications included a 
time stamp and proper enclosure of the ballot in the oath envelope. A main motivator for creating 
a paper trail of absentee ballots is because voters would call to make sure their absentee ballot 
arrived on time. Frankly, there was no way to tell if their ballot came in on time because it was 
like finding a needle in a haystack. Scanning the ballots as they came in provided a way to have 
accessible evidence for when the lawyers of the candidates came to the BOE to examine the 
ballots. Although this was not conventional election technology, we turned it into one. There was 
a Republican and Democrat who scanned the ballots and others who helped smooth them out for 
us. It was to be one in a bi-partisan manner. If one of us stepped away, we could not touch the 
ballots. There were numerous problems with this process. One problem was that the ballots had 
to be folded in a specific way to go through the scanner. Many voters folded them terribly 
causing the scanner to jam. The ballots also got stuck in the machine which caused many to get 
damaged. Hopefully, it did not prevent them from being scanned and eventually tabulated in the 
future. Luckily, my counterpart and I managed to scan the 80,000 ballots in about seven or eight 
days. We worked long hours to ensure that we would get it done, since we were the only ones 
who knew how to carry out the task. 
Another major task was the testing and programming of voting machines for the primary. 
I programmed about 15 BMD’s (Ballot Marking Devices). One type of BMD’s are voting 
machines that allow disabled voters mark a paper ballot before entering it into the tabulator. The 
BMD’s were around 10-15 years old and constantly crashed while programming them. They had 
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multiple attachments for different people with different types of disabilities. For people who 
required least assistance, there was an attachment that looked like an old game boy controller. 
This technology allows the voter to navigate the printing process. For those with auditory 
disabilities, there were headphones and a voice guides them through the process. Finally, for 
those who are unable to use any of these assisting devices, there was a tube that could be 
connected to the machine where the voter could blow into the tube and select their candidate. 
This was used during the primary. On election day, they were not the most reliable technology in 
the voting place. The machines were crashing and to printer attached to the BMD often failed. It 
was a tedious and cumbersome process that took days to complete. The machine comprised of a 
printer, LCD screen, a scanner, and an attached screen that projected the steps and the contests 
for the voter’s electoral district. One constant problem was the AVS stopped working. This led to 
delays in the overall process of preparing these machines for election day. 
The tabulators worked identically to the BMD’s used by the disabled. To program them, 
the machine needed to be turned on, then the two SD cards that hold the data had to be loaded. 
The programmer then waited for the AVS to fully load, and makes sure the date and time are 
correct. Most likely, the machine would have to be zeroed out from the previous time it was 
used. Then after that part of the process was completed, the test decks are put them through the 
machine as the test run. After that’s complete, a receipt would be printed noting the process. The 
same thing would be done for the “run for the record”. The first receipt is for the county’s record 
and the run for the record receipt gets sent to the State BOE. When that run is complete, the SD 
card was taken out and send it to get verified. The verification process was done in a bi-partisan 
manner. I was afforded the opportunity to be one of the verifiers one time. The verification 
process involved us inserting the SD card into the computer and reading the votes off it. If the 
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votes matched what we had on paper, the individual was clear to move to the next step. If not, 
the programmer had to start all over again. The test decks contained as little as 12 ballots and as 
much as 212 ballots. If there was a problem, you hoped you didn’t have the test deck with 212 
ballots. If the ballots were kept in order, one could go through the receipt and the ballot to see 
which one was missed. This was a long process that took days to complete and having to work 
with flaws in the verification only made it worse. At one point, we were told to skip the first run 
and go straight to the “run for the record” because of we were running behind. It helped that  any 
people who were programming the machines knew what they were doing, but they often would 
disappear for a few hours and leave their machines. The BOE did hire workers with no 
experience to help and they were the ones who frequently had issues with the programming and 
preparing. I and the more experienced employees ended up having to take over for them half of 
the time to speed up the process. I caught on quickly but many proceeded with caution. 
My experiences with voting technology paved the way for my interest and adaptation of 
this thesis. I am grateful to have had great exposure to election administration, voting 
technology, and to the standards which are used to run elections. It is noteworthy to mention that 
my experiences have opened up the opportunity for someone outside the organization to analyze 
the operations of the SCBOE, but it is not a representation of every Board of Elections in the 
United States. There are numerous factors that play a role in the administration of elections that 
takes place within each county, some of which will be explored in this paper. From what I saw, 
there are many things that could be improved upon at the Suffolk County Board of Elections. In 
terms of election technology, there is no doubt that the technology needs to be updated. It is also 
apparent that the standards applied to voting technology need to be re-evaluated. The people 
programming these machines, should be knowledgeable about them, and in turn know how to 
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catch inaccuracies in tabulation and programming. From what I saw, the SCBOE is run well. 
There is little concern surrounded by the accuracy of the election results they produce. Beyond 
the chaos that is within those four walls, the SCBOE is an example for other counties to follow 
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Chapter 3: Quantitative Analysis on the Effects of Race on Voting Technology 
Implementation 
 Quantitative analysis is the way by which variables can be examined to draw various 
conclusions on both a micro and macro level. This chapter seeks to establish that race is 
correlated to the advancement of election technology. This will be shown by analyzing counties 
in the United States. Investigating the impact on the advancement of voting technology will 
assist in uncovering the faults of election administration, some of which pertain to election 
technology. Previous research, which is discussed below, provides sufficient reasons to believe 
that race has an effect on the implementation and advancement of voting technology. This 
chapter focuses on comprehensive research comparing the racial composition of counties to the 
change implementation of voting technology over time.  
3.1 Methodology 
The challenges associated with election technology may not be fully due to the 
hierarchical structure of government that consists of local governments, state governments, and 
the federal government. The discrepancies seen across counties are partially tied to the citizens 
who reside there. Research from Tomz and Van Houweling (2003) concludes that analysis of 
county-level data from South Carolina and Louisiana shows a wide gap in voided ballots 
between Black and white populations. This gap is correlated to the type of equipment these 
groups used. The gap between white and Black voters was found to be between 4 and 6 
percent.88 The voting technologies these authors analyzed were optical scanners and punch card 
systems, which were the machines that faced much controversy after the 2000 Presidential 
Election.89 At this point, there was little research in these particular areas of election technology 
 
88  Tomz and Van Houweling, 47 
89 Tomz and Van Houweling, 46 
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and election administration. Similarly, little research has looked into the differences in racial 
complexities or incomplexities on the precinct-level.90 Other research on this topic points to 
similar results. Hanson evaluated this phenomenon in Palm Beach County and found a 
correlation between the percentage of overvoting and the percentage of registered Black voters in 
the county.91 On a similar note, this research was also expanded to the surroundings of Palm 
Beach County. Herron and Sekhon (2001) found a similar phenomenon in Broward, Duval, and 
Miami-Dade counties.92 Additionally, Fessesnden (2001) and Keating and Mintz (2001) 
provided evidence that ballots that had to be rejected occurred more in black precincts compared 
to white precincts.93   
To combat this occurrence, Tomz and Van Houweling (2003) bring attention a possible 
explanation for why this phenomenon occurred to Black populations in the states they analyzed. 
Tomz and Van Houweling state, “By Preventing overvoting and making undervoting more 
transparent and correctable, lever and DRE machines reduce the influence of fundamental 
factors- socioeconomic status disadvantages, relative inexperience, and racial antagonism- that 
might lead blacks to make mistakes or fail to correct them more often than whites.”94 There are a 
number of different factors that impact how a voter internalizes the steps to cast their vote. Many 
of these factors are most likely beyond the voter’s control. Although this research is from the 
early 2000’s, it is important to highlight the those who were Black in the counties studied were 
unable to cast their vote because of factors outside of the control of jurisdictions. In terms of 
election administration, variables mentioned by Tomz and Van Houweling are uncontrollable, 
 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid.  
92 Herron and Sekhon,154 
93 Tomz and Van Houweling, 47 
94 Tomz and Van Houweling, 49 
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but the selection of voting machines used as well as the training of poll workers controllable by 
the county Board of Elections. It is an imperative that each county government takes active steps 
to address the challenges certain minority groups face when going to cast their vote at the polls.  
The research conducted by these authors illuminates a fundamental issue. Every citizen, 
no matter how their racial identity, should be able to cast their vote and not have their aptitude, 
education level, or any other measure affect the result. Election administrations can address this 
issue with voting technology and by using their resources to properly address inconsistencies in 
the voting process. One limitation of the studies above is that they only looked at the residual 
votes of Black voters and not any other minority group. I hypothesize that Black populations 
within each county are not the only population that suffers from the lack of advancement of 
election technology. Additionally, there is limited research dedicated to election technology in 
today’s world, creating a question of how this phenomenon can be addressed. I seek to show, 
through data analysis, that race is a prevalent issue in election administration today and that it 
stretches far beyond the Black populations of each county. I will examine demographic groups 
such as Asian Americans, Hispanics, Black and whites in the years of 2010 and 2018. I have 
shown that the advancement of election technology is a lethargic process. A 10 year period 
should be sufficient to see if change was implemented and if the results had an effect on the 
voting process.  
At the beginning of this paper, I discussed how the mechanisms created to help 
administer elections are highly contingent on the resources provided to them by the different 
levels of the United States government. Resources such as funds to help assist in the 
administrating of elections are highly impacted by the individuals who reside in each county. 
One way to measure this affect is looking at demographic data and analyzing the racial 
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composition of each county. Data was gathered on the racial composition of each county in the 
United States from the United States Census’ Report- Annual County Resident Population 
Estimates by Age, Sex, and Hispanic Origins: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2019.95 Data on election 
technology used by each jurisdiction was collected from Verified Voting, a non-partisan 
organization that researches election administration.96 Analyzing this data will bring attention to 
where the country is in terms of its advancement of voting technology and how the demographic 
composition of each county affects such technological advancement. Using Microsoft Excel, 
data was synthesized to make a number of different conclusions which will be presented in the 
next section. By comparing the percentage of each minority to the advancement of over time 
illuminates which counties are advancing and which counties are not. It can also lead to 
correlations based on the relationship between counties whose percentage above and below the 
national average to the phasing out of old voting technologies and to the number of voting 
technologies each county has.  
With any national data set, there are fallacies with aspects of the data. For example, 
across the United States, states categorized the divisions of their state lines jurisdiction types 
other than counties. This presented an unique challenge when merging the U.S. Census 
demographic data with the voting technology data. To alleviate this challenge, any jurisdiction 
that was not categorized as a county was excluded. For example, the state of Connecticut 
categorically defined each geographic region as a county, but also as a town, village, etc. This 
led to each county being counted twice and to undefined numerical data. In a similar realm, 
counties that had data that was not recognized by the excel software was also removed from the 
 
95 U.S. Census, “States, Counties, and Statistically Equivalent Entities”. 3/14/21. 
https://www2.census.gov/geo/pdfs/reference/GARM/Ch4GARM.pdf 
96 Verified Voting, “The Verifier”, Accessed 3/14/21 
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data set. The state of Michigan had to be removed for this reason. Although a sizeable amount of 
data had to be excluded, it does not have any significant effects on the results of this study. As 
previously mentioned, there are over 3,000 counties in the United States. The attributes of these 
counties are mimicked in other counties, allowing these differences to be taken into 
consideration as a whole. It is also noteworthy to explain that the racial components of each state 
and county on a grand scale are similar across the country. It is a common theme that cities are 
more diverse, whereas rural towns are homogeneous in nature, often times having a majority of 
white individuals. 
As important as it was for the statistical analysis to account for the changes in voting 
technology usage, it was as important to create an understanding of the demographic components 
of each county. To calculate the national average, the regression used took the total for the 
specific demographic (White, Black, Asian, and Hispanic) to the total population of each county. 
The total population was calculated by adding the total female and male populations for each 
demographic group. To calculate these raw data points as a percentage, the total demographic 
was taken and divided by the total population for each perspective county to get the percentage 
of each demographic group. This was done for both 2010 and 2018. The goal of this maneuver 
was get an idea of where the country is in terms of its diversity. The reason why the percentages 
add to more than 100% is due to the fact that the Hispanic demographic is not a racial category. 
The U.S. Census states, “These standards generally reflect a social definition of race and 
ethnicity recognized in this country, and they do not conform to any biological, anthropological, 
or genetic criteria.”97 For the data analysis presented in this paper, the same reasoning the U.S. 
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Census ureses mimics the rational for using Hispanics as a variable. The results of this regression 
and regressions related to the national demographic will be presented in the next section. 
Using the national average as a base point, the demographic composition was analyzed 
for each state. The purchasing power of voting machines lies in the hands of counties. Due to 
this, the demographic composition of each county can provide various insights to county 
differences within a single state. To consolidate this approach, the highest and lowest averages 
were looked at in order to understand how drastic the variance was. If there is little variance, it 
would be plausible to assume that the number voting technologies would be similar per county. 
On the other hand, counties with a significant percent range of each minority group, could see a 
wide discrepancy of how many unique voting technologies are being used by majority white 
counties compared to other counties which are a minority majority. This will allow conclusions 
to be made on the county level.  
The county level is not the only important measure being analyzed. As indicated before, 
the delegation of election administration stems from the federal government down to state 
governments. The state governments then further delegates this responsibility to local 
jurisdictions. Analyzing the fluctuations in state demographics is important to understanding the 
relationship between counties and their decisions acquire new voting technology. To represent 
this idea, the average percent of each demographic group was taken for the years 2010 and 2018. 
To make timely conclusions, a random sample of states was taken. Using a random number 
generator, 10 different numbers were generated which related to the list of states in alphabetical 
order. The states that were randomly selected were—Arkansas, California, Illinois, Maryland, 
Nebraska, Nevada, New York, Oregon, Utah, and Wyoming. These states span the country and 
provide sufficient differences in racial disparity and other factors such as population size.  
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The methods to analyze voting technology trends involved much more manipulation. 
With the voting technology data coming from two years, 2010 and 2018, voting technology 
advancement trends became apparent. These trends were calculated by using a count of the 
machine type, leading to the numbers 1,0, and -1 to represent the loss (-1), gain (1), or no change 
(0) in the accumulation of voting technology. In order to see these trends, another regression was 
used to take the difference between the data for the year 2018 and the year 2010. The voting 
technologies with the most change were ballot marking devices, DRE touchscreens, batch-fed 
optical scanners, and hand-counted paper ballots. The change on a state and county level was 
interpreted by taking the average change over the two different years.  
Due to the nature of the data, it became apparent that comparing the total white 
percentages to each other variable percentage would lead to insignificant conclusions. The 
percentages were too similar. This could be due to the fact that race identity is not 
monochromatic and individuals more often than not identify as a singular demographic category. 
For this reason, it would be most beneficial to analyze the total minority percentage. To get this 
percentage, the Black, Asian, and Hispanic percentages were added together.  
 Before the results of this inquiry are shared, it is necessary to reiterate and share my 
hypothesizes. I hypothesize that the counties that are more racially diverse are more likely to be 
suffering from the lack of voting technology advancement. I also hypothesize that counties that 
have a majority white population will see the most advancement over the eight year time period. 
These sets of hypotheses set to provide evidence that the data will show a relationship between 
demographic composition of the county and its advancement with voting technology.  
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3.2 Results 
The data collected and analyzed in this inquiry highlight important insights such as how 
race correlates to the advancement of voting technologies. The way in which the data was 
analyzed was done intentionally. The results are derived from correlations, comparing the 
percentage of minority populations to the change or lack thereof for specific voting machines. 
There are many factors that contribute to why or why not counties don’t have the newest, most 
high-tech voting machines and it is for this reason that no monocausal argument can be made. 
Some factors outside the scope of this research include socioeconomic status, size of the 
county/jurisdiction, laws and statues regulating the electoral process, and the number of contests 
in each given election. These factors are no doubt important and do in fact partake in the overall 
explanation of the issues and challenges with advancing voting technology. Based on the 
historical significance of race in voting laws and elections in a general context, it is most 
important to analyze the effects race has on voting technology. More specifically, voting laws 
like the 1965 Voting Rights Act provides sufficient reasoning to believe that there is a strong 
correlation between race and aspects of election administration.  
Regarding the demographic composition of each county and state, it is apparent that the 
demographic of each jurisdiction fluctuated in interesting ways. The previous section previously 
mentioned that 10 states out of the 50 U.S. states were randomly selected. Overall, the states 
selected represent the country in terms of geographic region. The states chosen were Arkansas, 
California, Illinois, Maryland, Nebraska, New York, Oregon, and Wyoming. Due to the 
widespread nature of these states, it can be determined that these states are representative of all 
states within the United States. The national averages, which incorporated every state minus any 
county that had an error when matching the U.S. Census data to the voting technology data, was 
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calculated for both 2010 and 2018. The white population increased by six percent from 2010 to 
2018 while the average Black population dropped by one percent. Additionally, the Asian 
national population average remained the same over the eight year period and the Hispanic 
population average increased by one percent. When comparing the ten states chosen and their 
demographic composition percentages to the national percentages for both years, it is determined 
that each state isn’t drastically above or below the national average. Rather, in the case of the 
white populations,  these states were above the national average in both 2010 and 2018, below 
the average in both years for the black population, and at or one percentage point off from the 
national average for both the Hispanic and Asian populations. Out of the states selected, all of 
them have total minority percentages below the national average. These comparisons are 
represented in tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3. Significant conclusions can be drawn based on these 
national averages. The results confirm the belief that the states selected correspond with other 
states no matter if the state was selected for this study or not. Also, it formulates a specific 
prediction. If the demographic population for the four race variables are similar to the national 
average, then there should be little variance in the voting technology these states use. More 
specifically, the number of voting machines used should be similar and to each other as well as 













White 79% 85% 
Black 10% 9% 
Asian 1% 1% 
Hispanic 9% 10% 
Table 3.1 Representation of demographic composition of the United 
States in terms of the four variables analyzed in 2010 and 2018. 
Source: U.S. Census, Annual County Survey Results, 2019 
 















State White Black Asian Hispanic 
Arkansas 81% 16% 1% 5% 
California 84% 3% 5% 28% 
Illinois 92% 5% 1% 4% 
Maryland 78% 17% 3% 5% 
Nebraska 96% 1% 0% 5% 
Nevada 90% 2% 2% 15% 
New York 89% 7% 2% 7% 
Oregon 92% 1% 2% 10% 
Utah 95% 1% 1% 8% 
Wyoming 95% 1% 1% 8% 
Table 3.2 Breakdown of the average percent composition of white, Black, Asian, 
and Hispanic populations per each state for 2010. 
Source: U.S. Census, Annual County Survey Results, 2019 
 
 














The second part to this investigation was to analyze the implementation of new election 
technology over the eight year period. Results from this regression show that ballot marking 
devices (BMD’s), batch-fed optical scanners, DRE touchscreens, and hand counted paper ballots 
underwent the most change over the eight year period, whether they were phased out or were newly 
implemented. These results are logically coherent since older technologies, theoretically, should 
be phased out and new technologies should be phased in. On a state level, the results of each state 
analyzed were in tandem with each other. For ballot marking devices, seven of the ten states had 
counties that eliminated this voting technology while the other three saw no change. For batch-fed 
optical scanners, a majority of states added this voting technology to its repertoire from 2010 to 
2018. Only one state, the state of Arkansas, had counties that phased batch-fed optical scanners 
State White Black Asian Hispanic 
Arkansas 80% 16% 1% 6% 
California 85% 3% 6% 30% 
Illinois 91% 5% 1% 5% 
Maryland 75% 18% 4% 6% 
Nebraska 95% 1% 1% 7% 
Nevada 87% 2% 2% 17% 
New York 87% 7% 3% 8% 
Oregon 91% 1% 2% 12% 
Utah 94% 1% 1% 9% 
Wyoming 94% 1% 1% 9% 
Table 3.3 Breakdown of the average percent composition of white, Black, Asian, 
and Hispanic populations per each state for 2018. 
Source: U.S. Census, Annual County Survey Results, 2019 
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out of use. DRE touchscreens were phased out by almost all the states analyzed. Counties within 
the states of Maryland, Nevada, and Utah phased out this voting technology completely. Other 
states such as New York and Oregon saw no change in its counties for this technology. Hand 
counted paper ballots are considered the oldest technology used for voting. Logically, the 
assumption that as time goes on, older voting technologies are removed from the voting process 
while more advanced technologies are implemented, is not justified by the results. In all but three 
states, counties didn’t change how they implemented hand-counted paper ballots. Only two states, 


















Arkansas 12% 0% -17% 96% -19% 
California 11% -24% 19% -62% 0% 
Illinois 12% -39% 3% -59% 0% 
Maryland 11% 0% 30% -100% 0% 
Nebraska 13% -100% 2% 0% 0% 
Nevada 11% 0% 88% -100% 0% 
New York 11% -16% 31% 0% -56% 
Oregon 11% -100% 0% 0% 0% 
Utah 11% 0% 62% -100% 0% 
Wyoming 12% -87% 4% -13% 0% 
Average 
 
-37% 22% -34% -8% 
Table 3.4 Categorization of each type of voting technology analyzed in terms of the 
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 The manipulation of demographic and voting technology data brings significant insights 
to how the factor of race correlates to the incorporation of new technology into the voting 
process. Out of the ten states randomly selected, Nebraska had the highest total minority 
percentage, making it an outlier in the dataset. Overall, the trend seems to be that states and 
counties are phasing out more technology than they are implementing new technology. This is 
not necessarily a negative impact, but it does deem some concern. By removing technology from 
the voting process and not materializing new technology, it  indicates that there may be a shift 
relying less on multiple voting technologies by a majority of the counties analyzed in this study. 
This could be due to a lack of resources, which is undoubtedly alarming. Counties with the 
lowest minority percentage show the highest percentages of eliminating voting technology. 
Overall, Nebraska and Oregon had all their counties phase out ballot marking devices completely 
while the other counties didn’t see as much of a drastic change. This lends to the conclusion that 
counties that race may not have a significant impact the counties means to shift ballot marking 












Average Change in Voting Technology from 2010-2018
Hand Counted Paper Ballots DRE Touchscreen Batch-Fed Optical Scan Ballot Marking Device
Figure 3.1 Visual representing the data in table 3.4. This graph brings to life the real 
change that occurred over the eight year time period.  
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devices. It also points to the development that race is not the only variable to affect the 
implementation of new voting technology. 
 Another interesting dimension of the data produced is the continued dependence on hand-
counted paper ballots. Of the counties looked at closely, all but the state of Arkansas kept this 
technology in use. This is most likely due to their significance in recounting ballots and their 
ability to be used with a number of different voting machines. The fact that Arkansas removed 
hand-counted paper ballots from their arsenal of voting technologies is interesting based on the 
general dependence on them in elections. Since all counties in Arkansas phased out hand-
counted paper ballots, it would be beneficial to further investigate the reasoning behind this 
decision. Furthermore, the continued reliance on hand-counted paper ballots provides evidence 
that the historical relevance of paper ballots being an old technology does not affect the 
continued reliance on it. Nebraska had the highest minority percentage which was 13%, 
experiencing the highest rate of phasing out of selected voting technologies at the highest rate. 
Nebraska phased out two of their four voting technologies. On the other hand, for states that had 
a total minority percentage below the national average, the phasing out and implementation of 
new voting technologies more evenly divided. There was no clear direction as to if all the 
counties gained or lost a specific technology. 
 The evidence points to the conclusion that race is somewhat correlated to a county’s 
ability to incorporate new voting technologies, but there is no clear relationship between the 
demographic composition of counties and the implementation of new voting technologies. 
Sporadic results like these confirm that there is no one cause contributing to a counties ability to 
advance voting technologies. Additionally, these results confirm the individualistic nature of the 
implementation of voting technology. If the percent change over time correlated strongly to be 
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similar like the demographic condition, there would be similar change across all voting 
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Chapter 4: Conclusion 
 Election technology is instrumental to the administration of elections and to the essence 
of democratic practices in the United States. It is the way by which citizens of different 
backgrounds and beliefs elect officials to represent them in the government, allowing them to 
have a say in the decisions that are made. The electoral process, on the surface level, appears to 
be a seamless process with few faults. In this paper, I have shown that this perception is 
misguided. Once a voter leaves their intent on a piece of paper, they have no control over how 
their vote is transcribed. Additionally, reports by the media and what voters see on election day 
is a snapshot of the election process. This narrow view open to the public leads to the false 
perceptions held by many Americans.  
Due to my experience at the Suffolk County Board of Elections, I am able to look past 
these perceptions and notice the imperfect process of election administration. As an intern at the 
SCOBE, I took part in many aspects of administering elections. My experiences are unique 
considering I was an outsider to the process. Unlike the employees at the BOE, I was an intern 
for six weeks in total. I focused on preparing for early-voting, programmed different types of 
voting machines, processed absentee ballots, and researched New York State election law. As I 
worked in these areas, I was able to see how the practices and processes to carry out these tasks 
were outdated. I previously noted that when I was told to make the sign-in sheets for the poll 
workers for early voting, I was told to do it by hand. I spent hours attempting to draw straight 
lines and make it presentable when it could have been done on the computer in a matter of 
minutes. This one example mirrors the bogged down mindset of election administration. If it 
ain’t broke, don’t fix it. As a result, the culture of the SCBOE was stagnant. It wasn’t a 
coincidence that those who worked there took advantage of the nature of the job. By not 
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completing their job in a timely manner and by some employees not giving their best effort to the 
cause, they added to the difficulties of running an election. Mistakes were often made leading to 
the waste of time and resources, even though resources were always scarce. This is noteworthy 
to bring attention to because it highlights the attitudes of those within the BOE and can help 
explain why the overall architecture of election administration is the way it is. With the snapshot 
of how things are ran at the BOE, I can only ponder about what occurs at other BOE’s across the 
country.  
My time spent programming voting machines led to my complex understanding of their 
role in election administration. A voting machine’s objective is to translate voter intent into an 
entity that can be counted. A machine that malfunctions or is programmed the wrong way can 
fail at transcribing voter intent. If this happens, the fragilities of democracy are exposed. The 
intricacies and time-consuming nature of programming and preparing voting machines made it a 
tedious process, but mistakes were made and valuable time was misappropriated. Even though 
many made minor mistakes along the way, it cannot be assumed that this did not have any effect 
on election day. Safeguards were implemented to catch these mistakes, but there is still a 
possibility that they could of gone unnoticed. It didn’t take very long to get the hang of things 
and seasoned election workers were able to get through a number of machines a day. It was the 
people who were efficient who made up the time that was lost. Workers hid in their office areas 
because they knew that what they would be doing would be boring. Their lack of initiative with 
this task was no doubt harmful to election preparations.  
The study of election technology has been put on the backburner by presidential 
administrations as well as by scholars and elected officials. Administrations have other pressing 
matters, and election administration and voting technology is not on their radar. When it is a 
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topic of discussion, those discuss campaign-finance issues and those running for candidacy. 
Additionally, the media only focuses on the problems on election day and not the overall 
process. When they came into the BOE and record two different segments, the administrators 
talked about the challenges of processing thousands of absentee ballots, something that worried 
voters. Not enough resources are dedicated to the study voting technology advancement and for 
that reason, the lack of attention is a threat to democratic practices in the United States.  
A historical perspective of voting technology is essential to understanding the 
advancement of election technology and most importantly the temporal component of the 
process. Douglas Jones provides a comprehensive timeline of the history of election technology. 
From his perspective, one can understand how election technology evolved to what is known to 
be today. It is also noteworthy to acknowledge that some of the oldest technologies are still in 
use today such as the paper ballot. Furthermore, the timeline of advancement for some voting 
technologies is hundreds of years, while for other types of technology it takes less time. This 
may be due to a lack of emphasis on election technology or the lack of funds appropriated to this 
area of study. Today, the most advanced technologies on the market are direct recording 
electronic (DRE’s) voting machines, ballot marking devices, and optical scanners. Finally, the 
implementation of voting technologies in a county is not aligned with the temporal component of 
the advancement of voting technologies. Currently, “old technologies” are being used in many 
counties. As previously mentioned, most technology is viable for a decade, and when many of 
these technologies have been in use for longer than the recommended time period, it is 
detrimental to the electoral process and threatens democracy. 
The 2000 Presidential Election was a major wake up call to the United States 
government, election officials, and the general public and proves today, that issues with voting 
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technology are nothing new. In Palm Beach County, Florida, the Presidential Election was 
decided by the Florida Supreme Court because it was too close of a race between Al Gore and 
George W. Bush. For this election, Palm Beach County elected to use a new type of ballot which 
resulted in mass confusion among voters. Many who intended to vote for Al Gore had their vote 
misinterpreted, leading to Bush winning the election. The 2000 mishap shines an unfortunate 
spotlight on how voting technologies can have unforeseen consequences on election outcomes. 
In turn, the U.S. government responded to this disaster by passing the Help America Vote Act 
enacted in 2002. This act targeted multiple issues in election administration such as election 
technology and voter registration. For election technology, this act was the first act in decades 
that provided strict guidelines for states to follow and required that each jurisdiction have a 
voting machine for those who are disabled. This was to help provide the disabled voter with a 
sense of privacy while they cast their vote. The federal government tied monetary funds to this 
shift, giving jurisdictions the ability to purchase newer technologies. The HAVA required 
counties to phase out punch card voting systems and lever voting systems, since they were a 
source of problems in the 2000 election. Although legislation like the Help America Vote Act 
was essential to bringing about significant change in the application of voting technology, it only 
put a band-aid on a more serious problem. The HAVA is not a long-term solution to solve issues 
pertaining to the advancement of voting technology. 
A reason why the federal government can only have a small role in election 
administration is due to the role of federalism in elections. Weinstein-Tull provides a thorough 
review of election federalism and the conflicts and limitations endured by the levels of 
government. The basis of Weinstein-Tull’s argument is that the three branches of government--
federal, state, and local-- delegate tasks of election administration as ordered by the U.S. 
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Constitution. The Election Clause gives states the right to run elections, but the federal 
government has the power to oversee the states actions. Since the Elections Clause gives state 
governments a considerable amount of power, states can do as they please without little 
pushback from the federal government. Weinstein-Tull takes this argument further, arguing that 
states “hyperfederalize” elections by delegating election administration to counties and other 
localities. In theory, this hierarchal set-up should produce secure, unbiased, and reliable 
outcomes in elections. That is not the case. Local jurisdictions are burdened to carry the weight 
of elections and they do not have sufficient resources to ensure the reliability and accuracy of 
elections. There are also other liability issues between state and local governments when it 
comes to who is responsible for violations of statues and law. Overall, electoral federalism 
diffuses responsibility between levels of government and aids in the challenges of election 
administration.  
Elections are in fact political. Elections are held for voters to pick who they would like to 
see in public office. Elected officials advocate for their constituents on a number of different 
issues. Besides the fact that elections are held by elected officials, the Help America Vote Act 
was enacted by the elected officials voters put into office. The mechanism by which voters show 
their intent is by using voting technology on election day, hence making it a part of the political 
apparatus. In 2020, election technology became a front page issue that grabbed the attention of 
many. During the 2020 election, President Trump and his allies made countless accusations 
against Dominion Voting Systems Inc., claiming that the company flipped voted intended for 
Trump and turned them into votes for Biden. It was also claimed that the company had ties to 
ANTIFA and that the company fixed the election of Hugo Chávez. Dominion Voting Systems 
Inc. filed a lawsuit against Rudy Giuliani and other allies of the former president arguing 
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defamation. Dominion Voting Systems Inc. is a manufacturer of voting machines used by many 
U.S. counties and the slandering of this company undermines the reliability and accuracy of the 
voting machines they produce. This is a political problem because it undermines the electoral 
process and the way Americans choose their representatives. 
Based on everything previously discussed, it is apparent that elections are fragile and can 
be affected by the most minor and “harmless” occurrences. What this examination questioned, as 
a potential explanation for the variance of coting technology used by counties, is effects of the 
demographic composition of a county on the county’s ability to advance their arsenal of voting 
technology. This examination is based on the fact that there are a number of different legislation 
that aimed to combat racial inequalities in voting, most notably the Voting Rights Act of 1964. 
Additionally, research by Tomz and van Houweling  and other scholars provides sufficient 
arguments to conclude that race has a negative impact on use of voting technology in counties. 
Research by these scholars focused on Black populations in select states and counties. The 
research in this paper takes a broader approach to the issue. I hypothesized that the counties that 
are more racially diverse are more likely to be suffering from lack of advancement in election 
technology and that counties that are mostly composed of white voters will have the most 
advancement of election technology over the eight year period. In order to test my hypothesis, I 
took data from Verified Voting, a non-partisan think tank, and the U.S Census. The data was 
then matched up to create a comprehensive dataset, allowing for a multitude of comparisons to 
made. The results show no clear correlation between the racial composition of counties and their 
advancement of voting technologies from 2010 to 2018. This may be contributed to the fact that 
there is not one single cause that affects the advancement and implementation of voting 
technology. This is somewhat reassuring because if race played a significant role in the 
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advancement of election technology, the voting process would be biased and not be 
representative of all people. Another important finding is that counties are phasing out 
technology faster than they are implementing more advanced voting technologies. This is to 
some extent a concern because it shows that counties may be lacking resources and are indirectly 
threatening the reliability of elections. In terms of specific voting technologies, ballot marking 
devices were used my states with counties composing mostly of white voters. This result 
presupposes the conclusion that race plays a role in election technology, but the extent to which 
it does is unknown.  
The implications of this research represent the need for more research and more attention 
to this area of study. The most research dedicated to election technology occurred after the 2000 
Presidential Election. Since then, it has been twenty-one years since any significant amount of 
attention given to this area of study. There needs to be more current research on this topic, since 
technology in a general sense is advancing rapidly. Additionally, this research has connected 
data on voting technology on a national scale to U.S. census data, opening up opportunity for 
these comparisons to be made with a new perspective. This paper should not be the end of this 
research, since only one factor that affects the advancement of voting technology was looked at. 
As previously mentioned, there is no monocausal factor that affects this phenomenon. There is 
much more research that needs to be done to get a full picture of how these factors affect voting 
technology implementation and how these factors interact with each other. 
Additionally, federal, state, and local governments need to make it a priority to work 
together on election administration. The delegation of such power was done to recognize the 
sovereignty of state governments, not because they felt that county localities are entitled to 
administer elections. One way would be for the federal government to provide continued 
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assistance to state and local governments through funding research on voting technology and 
prescribing more resources to the Federal Election Commission and the Election Assistance 
Commission. These groups are subjected to the power of the executive branch, and history has 
shown that they have been disregarded under certain presidents. The federal government should 
also provide more assistance to counties that are impoverished and disadvantaged in terms of 
their funding and access to resources. The interactions between local and state governments 
should not be one of tension. State governments ought to take some responsibility for the burden 
states place on counties by delegating election administration to them. When legal challenges 
arise, they should not put the blame on local governments. Instead, they should recognize their 
role in assisting in the administration process and understand how they can ensure their state 
carries out fair elections. If the federalist relationship between the three levels of government 
change, the administration of elections would be carried out more equally across the country.  
Free elections are what makes the United States a democracy. By putting them on the 
backburner, we threaten their intended existence. In this paper, I have shown how fragile the 
process is and what is at stake if we don’t actively work to improve voting technology. From my 
experiences, Suffolk County (NY) worked diligently to conduct an election that survived the 
hiccups along the way. It is not because of any law or because of the demographic composition 
of the county, but rather the leadership of those elected to this office. The leadership of officials 
in BOE’s across the U.S. are not the same which may add to this phenomenon. Voting 
technology is the way by which voters express their intent. When they fail, the ability of voters 
to express their choice is compromised, and in turn democracy is compromised. This research 
shows that there are factors that affect the implementation and advancement of voting 
technology, which need to be addressed. Government agencies, scholars, and voters ought to 
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